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n his remarks as a member of the Types of NlACs and Applicable Law Panel at
the Naval War College's International Law Conference on Non-International

Armed Conflict in the 21st Century, held from June 21 to 23, 20 11, David Graham described the lawofnon -internationaI armed conflict as being located at the "vanishing point of the law of war."
This is not surprising, because. as Graham further noted, States resist the application of international law to their struggles with rebels. In particular, they resist
according status to rebels by applying the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to them.
Rather, they prefer to deal with rebels under their own national criminal laws. free
from any constraints that might be imposed by the law of armed conlliet. For example. Charles Garraway, speaking on the same panel as Graham, pointed out that
the United Kingdom never acknowledged "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland as
an "armed conflict" to which the law of armed conflict might apply.
From a historical perspective, express treaty law governing non-international
armed conflict was formerly virtually non-existent. After the carnage of World
War II, and the extreme brutality of the Nazi Germany fo rces, however, there was a
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marked change of attitude. As reported by Gary D. Solis in his 2010 magisterial
treatise:
The framers of the 1949 Conventions determined that there must be some minimal internatio nal humanitarian protections for the victims of internal armed conflicts---<onflictsoccurring within one state's borders, not involving a second nation. World War II
revealed the stark absence of protections for civilians in wartime. To raise new
protections would involve a departure from Geneva's previously uninterrupted fixa tion on conflicts between states and a certain disrega rd of the long-entrenched act of
state doctrine. The international community was unanimous, however, that it could
not stand by while depredations such as those committed by the Nazis took place in
future conflicts, internal or not. Not even in the United Nations Charter is there a similar effort to regulate intrastate armed fo rce. I

The result was Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 2 ft is the
only article in the Geneva Conventions that COVers internal armed conflict, and
"when com mon Article 3 applies, no other part of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
applies."3 Common Article 3 provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, at a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces,
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . ...

As Solis notes, "There follows a brief list of prohibitions, acknowledged to be incomplete: violence to life and person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; the taking of hostages; humiliating and degrading treatment;
and the passing of sentences without previous judgments from regularly constit uted
COUrts."4 The positive obligation that Common Article 3 imposes on States parties to
the Geneva Conventions is, in non-international armed conflicts, to treat those who
are l/Drs de combat (out of the figh t) humanely. The drafters ofCommon Article 3 decided, however, not to elaborate on the meaning of "humane treatment."5
The International Committee of the Red Cross's (JCRC's) study of customary
international law does provide generalized guidance as to what constitutes humane
treatment:
The actual mea ning of ~ humane treatment" is not spelled out . ... The requirement .. .
is an overarching concept. It is generally understood that the detailed rules found in
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international humanitarian law and human rights law give expression to the meaning
of ~humane treatment." ... However, these rules do not necessarily express the full
meaning of what is meant by humane treatment, as this notion develops over time under the influence of changes in sodety.6

By its terms, Common Article 3 applies only to non-international armed conflicts. As shall be seen below, however, international and national court decisions
have declared that its humanitarian norms are so basic that, today, Common Article 3 extends to international armed confli cts as well.
At this early stage in this essay, it is important to note that the international and
national jurisprudence that has declared Common Article 3 extends to international armed conflict illustrates a major difficulty with Common Article 3: bcrause
of its sparse wording and inherent ambiguities, Common Article 3 raises more
questions than it answers, and, in particular, these include issues of when it applies
and whether it can be the basis for criminal prosecutions in international or national tribunals.
Before we turn to some of these issues, we need to note the second primary
source of treaty law on non-international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol 11
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.7 Like Additional Protocol 1,8 which concerns international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol II is a supplement to the 1949
Geneva Conventions and does not amend or replace any part ofthem.9 Although
Additional Protocol II has 166 States parties,IO a number of major States, including
the United States and Israel, for example, are not parties, and it is unclear what provisions, if any, of the Protocol represent customary internationallaw. 11 Moreover,
Additional Protocol II is a good example of the unwillingness of States to be
governed by international law in their internal conflicts with rebel grou ps. This is
bcrause the "threshold" of applicability of Protocol II to a non-international
armed conflict is extremely high. Under Article 1(1), Protocol II only applies to
conflicts between the armed forces of a State party "and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol." Paragraph 2 of
Article I provides that the Protocol "shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other
acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts."
The result of these explicit limitations is that Additional Protocol II is basically a
non -operational treaty. As one commentator has noted, the international criminal
tribunals fo r the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda
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have produced very little jurisprudence related to Additional Protocol II ... and no accused has been convicted for a violation of the Protocol. . .. The limited categories of
anned conflicts to which Additional Protocol II may be said to apply and doubts as to
the extent to which it is now part of customary international law have deterred the
Prosecution from entering the realm of Additional Protocol II with much enthusiasm,
preferring instead to rely on common Article 3 .... Il
Similarly, George Aldrich, who was the head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on the Protocols, has written dismissively: "Protocol II ... affords very limited protections and has escape clauses designed to make its applicability easily
deniable. In the end, the only useful result of Protocol II may be to make it somewhat more likely that [Common [ Article 3 ... may be found applicable in lieu of
ProtocoIII." !)
1. Filling .he Gaps in and Expanding the Coverage of

Common Article 3
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, a form er head of the ICRe's Legal Division, has contended
that the current law of armed conflict is not the major problem, but rather it is the
failure to implement it in good faith. 14 This seems clear, but there are at the least
major differences as to interpretation of the existing rules, even among the leading
experts of developed Western States, to say nothing of on a worldwide basis. Ideally,
these ambiguities would be resolved by international negotiations to revise the
existing law. However, as Dr. Lavoyer has noted, the risk of this route is that it
might open Pandora's box and result in a much less rather than more satisfactory
law of armed conflict. IS
As to gaps in Common Article 3, it is important to note that neither the Geneva
Conventions, including Common Article 3, nor Additional Protocol I contains a
definition of an "armed conflict." In contrast, as we have seen, Additional Protocol
II, in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article I, defines non-international armed conflicts in
such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. But in 1995, in the TadicInterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 16 the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (iCrY) stepped into the breach and addressed the preliminary
issue of the existence of an armed conflict in response to a contention by the defendant that there had been no active hostilities in the area of the alleged crimes at the
relevant time:
[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International
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humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the
case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole te rritory of the warring States
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory unde r the control of a party,
whether or not actual combat takes place there. L7

This definition covers both international and non- international conflicts. There
is a question whether under it, the U.S. conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an
armed conflict. As I suggested in another forum,
[tJhe only time this conflict could have qualified as an international armed conflict
would have been when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to
the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were integrated into the Taliban forces, the de facto
army of Afghanistan. At present . .. both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as insurgents in Afghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal
armed conflict. L8

By now it is well known that in Hamdan v. RumsfeldL9 the Supreme Court rejected the assertion by the U.S. government that since Al-Qaeda was not a State and
had not accepted that it would be governed by the rules set forth in the Geneva
Conventions, its affiliates could not invoke their protections. Rather, a plurality of
the Court held that the so-called "war on terror" was a non-international armed
conflict, and therefore that at a minimwn Common Article 3 applies to the conflict
with Al-Qaeda. To be sure, this holding has been subject to considerable criticism,
best illustrated perhaps by Yoram Dinstein's argument that "from the vantage
point of international law . . . a non-international armed conflict cannot possibly
assume global proportions."20 There are supporters of the Court's holding, however, and there is no consensus on this issue. 2L
In light of current developments, the distinction between international and
non- international armed conflict may be becoming irrelevant, at least as long as an
"armed conflict" is present. As Kenneth Watkin has noted, there is a "trend under
humanitarian law to apply the established rules fo r governing international armed
conflict to its non-international counterpart."22 This trend, however, has not been
based on the conclusion of new conventions, or even the revision ofold conventions,
on the law of armed contlict. Rather, it has been based on international judicial decisions, especially the decision of the lCTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadii,
which claimed in 1995 that "it cannot be denied that customary rules have developed to govern internal strife."23 The Tribunal identified some of these rules as
covenng
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such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate
attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain
methods of conducting hostilities. 24

The ICRC has also actively promoted the idea of applying the rules governing
international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict through the customary international law process, especially in its two-volume Customary International Humanitarian Law study.25 Customary international law has long played an
important role in the development of the law of armed conflict, as illustrated by
the Martens Clause, which was named after Frederick de Martens, a leading Russian
international lawyer who was a Russian delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences
of 1889 and 1907. The Martens Clause first appeared in the preambles of Hague
Convention (II ) of 1899 and Hague Convention (N) of 1907 Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land. 26 A recent example of the Martens Clause may be
found in Article 1(2) of Protocol I of 1977, which reads as follows: "In cases not
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of internationallaw derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and
from the dictates of public conscience."
It should be noted, however, that the nature of the customary international law
process has become increasingly controversial. Patrick Kelly, a leading critic, has
suggested that in many-perhaps most-instances of alleged customary internationallaw norms, there may be little dear evidence that the vast majority of States
have accepted the norm as a legal obligation. 27 The result is that, according to Kelly,
"much of international law is announced in books and articles with little input
from nations .... Much ofClL [customary internationallaw[ is a fiction. "28 It
should come as no surprise therefore that the methodology employed by the ICRC
in its study of customary international humanitarian law has itself come under attack-most particularly, in the November 3, 2006 joint letter from John Bellinger
III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, and William J. Haynes, General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the
ICRC, setting forth the U.S. government's "initial reactions" to the ICRe's study.29
The letter states that "based on our review so far, we are concerned about the methodology used to ascertain rules and about whether the authors have proffered sufficient facts and evidence to support those rules." Although noting that «[g[iven the
Study's large scope, we have not yet been able to complete a detailed review of its
conclusions," the authors go on to state that they thought it would be "constructive
to outline some of our basic methodological concerns and, by examining a few of
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the rules set forth in the Study, to illustrate how these flaws call into question some
of the Study's conclusions."30
A detailed discussion of the authors' concerns is beyond the scope of this essay.
For present purposes it suffices to note that the letter finds fault with both the
study's assessment of State pmctice and its approach to the opinio juris requirement. The authors also find fault with the study's formulation of the rules and its
commentary. Significantly, the letter finds that these faul ts contribute to
two more general errors in the Study that are of particular concern to the United States:
First, the assertion that a significant number of rules contained in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions have achieved the status of customary international
law applicable to all States, including with respect to a significant number of$tates (including the United States and a number of other States that have been involved in
armed conflict since the Protocols entered into fo rce) that have declined to become a
party to those Protocols; and
Second, the assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary intemationallaw
in internal anned conflict notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in support of those propositions. 3l

In closing the letter the authors indicated their "appreciation fo r the JeRe's continued efforts in this important area, and hope that the material provided in this
letter and in the attachment will initiate a constructive, in-depth dialogue with the
JeRe and others on the subject."32
In July 2007, Jean-Marie Henckaerts responded to the Bellinger/ Haynes letter)3
His response focused largely on methodological issues and, following the structure
of the U.S. comments, addressed the following questions:
I. What density of practice is required for the format ion of customary international
law and what types of practice are relevant?
2. How did the Study assess the existence of opillio juris!
3. What is the weight of the commentaries on the rules?
4. What are the broader implications of the Study with respect to Additional Protocols I and II and the law on non-international anned conflicts in particular?
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Because U.S. comments also addressed four particular rules of the study,
Henckaerts's response dealt with the main aspects ofthose comments as part of the
discussion of the methodological issues. The rules included "Rule 31 (protection of
humanitarian relief personnel), Rule 45 (p rohibition on causing long-term widespread and severe damage to the environment), Rule 78 (prohibition of the use of
antipersonnel exploding bullets) and Rule 157 (right to establish universal jurisdiction over war crimes).":J.I
As with respect to the Bellinger/Haynes letter, this is not the time or place to set
forth a detailed discussion of Henckaerts's responses to the U.S. concerns. For
present purposes, it suffices to note that the JCRC rejects the U.S. contention that
there is little evidence to support the assertion that certain rules in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary international law in internal armed conflict. On the contrary, in the ICRC view:
[TJhe conclusion of the Study that many rules contained in the Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary international law in non-international armed conflict is the result of state practice to this
effect. ...
[DJeveiopments of in ternational humanitarian law since the wars in the fo rmer
Yugoslavia and Rwanda point towards an application of many areas of huma nitarian
law to non-international armed conflicts. For example, every hu manita rian law
treaty adopted since 1996 has been made applicable to both international and noninternational armed conflicts... .
The criminal tribunals and courts set up, first for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
and later for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly with violations committed in noninternational armed conflicts. Similarly, the investigations and prosecutions currently
under way before the International Criminal Court are related to violations committed
in situations of internal armed conflict . These develop ments are also sustained by
other practice such as m ilitary manuals, national legislation and case-law, official
statements and resolutions of international organizations and conferences. In this respect particular care was taken in Volume I to identify specific practice related to
non-international armed conflict and, on that basis, to provide a separate analysis of
the customary nature of the rules in such conflicts. Finally, where practice was less exte nsive in non-international armed conflicts, the corresponding rule is acknowledged
to be only "arguably" applicable in non-international armed conflicts.
When it comes to "operational practice" related to non-international armed conflicts,
there is probably a large mix of official practice supporting the rules and of their outright violation. To suggest, therefo re, that there is not enough practice to sustain such a
broad conclusion is to confound the value of existing "positive" practice with the many
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violations of the law in non-international armed conflicts. This would mean that we let
violators dictate the law or stand in the way of rules emerging. The result would be that
a whole range of heinous practices committed in non-international armed conflict
would no longer be considered unlawful and that commanders ordering such practices
would no longer be responsible for them. This is not what states have wanted They
have wanted the law to apply to non-international armed conflicts and they have
wanted commanders to be responsible and accountable.3s

The Bellinger/Haynes letter, in challenging the ICRC study's assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols have
become binding as a matter of customary international law in internal armed confli ct, claims that "there is little evidence in support of those propositions."36 The
Henckaerts response attempts to provide such evidence. First, it correctly notes
that "every humanitarian law treaty adopted since 1996 has been made applicable
to both international and non-international armed conflict.")7 But none of these
treaties extends any of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions or of the Additional Protocols to non -international armed conflict, so the relevance of this State
practice to the issue is questionable at best.
Similarly, it is, of course, correct that the International Criminal Tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the globally focused International
Criminal Court and the hybrid tribunal for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly
with violations committed in non-international armed conflicts. The basic issue
faced by these various tribunals is whether the concept of war crimes and grave
breaches are applicable in internal as well as international armed conflict. Resolution of this issue in turn depends upon the statutes of the various tribunals and the
tribunals' interpretation of their terms.
As Gary Solis has noted, the ICfY Appeals Chamber, in its decision in the Tadii
case, first answered the basic question in the negative. According to the Appeals
Chamber, "[ we [ must conclude that, in the present state of development of the law,
Artide 2 of the [IerY[ Statute ["Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949"]
only applies to offences committed within the context of international armed conflicts. "38 By its decision the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's ruling
to the contrary. At the same time, later in its decision, in dicta, the Appeals Chamber
foreshadowed later change when it stated,
[W]e have no doubt that they [violations of rules of warfare in intemationallaw] entail
individual responsibility, regardless of whether they are committed in internal or international armed conflicts. Principles and rules of humanitarian law reflect "elementary
considerations of humanity" widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for conduct in armed conflicts of any kind.:J9
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As Solis notes, six years later the Appeals Chamber took the step it had foreshadowed in its dicta in TadiC.<IO It ruled in the Celebici case that "to maintain a legal distinction between the two legal regimes and their criminal consequences in
respect of similarly egregious acts because of the differences in the nature of the
conflicts would ignore the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions."41
Many commentators welcomed the Celebici ruling. Guenael Mettraux, for example, opined that "[t ]he acknowledgement by the ad hoc [Yugoslav and Rwanda]
Tribunals that much of the law of international armed conflicts would apply in the
context of internal armed conflicts may be one of their most significant jurisprudential achievements, as far as war crimes are concerned."42 For his part, Theodor
Meron emphatically stated, "There is no moral justification, and no truly persuasive legal reason, for treating perpetrators of atrocities in internal conflicts more
leniently than those engaged in international wars."00
This commentator, however, is concerned that both the Yugoslav and Rwanda
tribunals and commentators such as Mettraux and Meron may be setting forth the
de lege ferenda rather than the lex lata. To put it somewhat differently, they may be
failing to distinguish between the is and the ought. There would seem to be compelling reasons for applying much of the law of international armed conflict in the
context of non-international armed conflicts, but it is not clear that States, acting
through treaties or the customary international law process, have done so. Neither
judges on the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals nor prominent scholars, despite the
important roles they play in the international legal process in general, have been
endowed with the capacity to make that extension of the law.
On the other hand, Solis may be on sounder ground when he reports that " [t ]he
domestic legislation of fifty-four states criminalizes serious violations of LOAC in
internal armed conflicts."44 Such legislation is generally regarded as constituting a
form of State practice that may contribute to the formulation of a customary international law norm. Moreover, the binding nature of such legislation in the domestic legal system of the acting State may supply evidence of opinio juris, acceptance of
the practice as law, the second, and perhaps most important, element of customary
internationallaw. 4s
Solis also points to the United Kingdom's Manual of the Law of Armed Cot/flict
in support of the proposition that customary international law provides for war
crimes and grave breaches in non-international armed conflicts.46 He quotes the
Manual as follows:
Although the treaties governing internal armed conflict contain no grave breach provisions, customary international law recognizes that serious violations of those treaties
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can amount to punishable war crimes. It is now recognized that there is a growing area
of conduct that is criminal in both international and internal armed conflict ....~ 7
Yoram Dinstein has applauded reliance on legislative codes and military manuals
as illustrations of State practice: "Irrefutably, legislative codes and m ilitary Manuals (i.e., binding instructions to the arm ed forces) are invaluable sources of genuine
State practice."48 It is noteworthy, however, that Solis cites and quotes only the
U.K. Manual. It is not clear, therefore, whether the position of the U.K. Manual has
been adopted in the manuals of other major military powers.
In any event, it is likely that the challenges contained in the Bellinger/Haynes
letter to the alleged two general errors in the ICRC study will no t be successful. This
is because the two positions of the ICRC study are so attractive as de lege ferenda
that they will eventually be accepted as the lex lata. The reality is that Common
Article 3 and Protocol II are clearly inadequate to govern non -international armed
conflicts, and selective extension of the legal regime governing international armed
conflicts to supplement the current law governing non -international armed
conflicts makes enormous good sense. Ideally, of course, this extension should be
effected by the conclusion of new---or the revision of current-global treaties. But
if this method of extension is a missio n impossible, as the evidence convincingly
demonstrates, then customary international law methodology will have to be employed, even if there is continuing disagreement as to exactly what that methodology entails.

II. Rethinking the Possible Benefits of Additional Protocol II
Perhaps it is time for the United States to reevaluate the possible benefits of beeoming a party to Additional ProtocollI. As indicated above, the primary criticism of
Additional Protocol II has been that its threshold of applicability is too high. It
should be noted, however, that when President Ronald Reagan submitted Additional Pro tocol II to the Senate for its ad vice and consent to ratification,49 he did so
with a declaration that read : "The United States declares that it will apply this Protocol only to those conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and to all such conflicts, and encourages all other States to
do likewise." Secretary of State George P. Shultz's Letter of Submittal to President
Reagan of December 13, 1986 describes the reasons for the declaration:
The final text of Protocol II did not meet all the desires of the United States and other
western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal conflicts in which
dissident annedgroups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a
part of the national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted militaryoperations.
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This is a narrower scope than we would have desired, and has the effect of excluding
many internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area. We are therefore recommending that US ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the
United States will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the
1949 Conventions (and only such conflicts), which will include all non-international
armed conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, riots and
sporadic acts of violence). This understanding will also have the effect of treating as
non-international these so-called "wars of national liberation" described in Article
1(4) of Protocol I which fail to meet the traditional test of an international conflict.50

The approach of the Reagan administration, therefore, would resolve the primary problem of Additional Protocol II by declining to follow the provisions of Article 1( I) of Additional Protocol II that would severely limit its applicability, opting
instead to apply its other provisions to all non-international armed conflict covered by Common Article 3. It also would counter the most unacceptable-to the
United States-aspect of Additional Protocol I by treating as non-international the
"wars of national liberation" that are described and treated in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I as international armed conflicts. Such an approach might serve to
turn Additional Protocol II from its current status as a basically non-operational
treaty to one that could usefully be applied to many of the internal conflicts characteristic of to day's armed conflicts, and a treaty that could enhance and strengthen
the legal regime governing non-international armed conflicts.
The report of the Department of State on Additional Protocol II, transmitted by
President Reagan with the Protocol to the Senate,SI contains a detailed analysis of
the various provisions of the Protocol. In his Letter of Submittal to President Reagan,
Secretary of State George Shultz spells out the ways in which the Protocol
was designed to expand and refme the basic humanitarian provisions contained in
Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non· international
conflicts. While the Protocol does not (and should not) attempt to apply to such
conflicts all the protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed
conflicts. such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants, it does attempt
to guarantee that certain fundamental protections be observed, including: (1) humane
treatment for detained persons, such as protection from violence, torture, and collective punishment; (2) protection from intentional attack, hostage-taking and acts ofterrorism of perwns who take no part in hostilities; (3) special protection for children to
provide for their safety and education and to preclude their participation in hostilities;
(4) fundamental due process for persons against whom sentences are to be passed or
penalties executed; (5) protection and appropriate care for the sick and wou nded, and
medical units which assist them; and (6) protection of the civilian population from
military attack, acts of terro r, deliberative starvation, and attacks against installations
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containing dangerous forces. In each case, Protocol II expands and makes more specific the basic guarantees of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. 52

Hence, application of Additional Protocol II to non-international armed conflicts would greatly strengthen the humanitarian protections of Common Article 3,
and, as President Reagan suggested in his Letter of Transmittal, "[ iJfthese fundamental rwes were obselVed, many of the worst human tragedies of current internal
armed conflicts could be avoided."51
It is worth noting that on March 7, 2011, the Obama administration issued a
White House press release in which it indicated its strong support for the ratification of Additional Protocol II and its intention to apply the principles of Article 75
of Protocol I to "any individual it detains in an international armed conflict."S4In
pertinent part, the press release reads as follows:
Support for a Strong International Legal Framework
Because of the vital importance of the rule oflaw to the effectiveness and legitimacy of
our national security policy, the Administration is announcing our support for two
important components of the internationailegaI framework that covers armed conflicts: Additional Protocol II and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
Additional Protocol II, which contains detailed humane treatment standards and fair
trial guarantees that apply in the context of non-international anned conflicts, was
originally submitted to the Senate for approval by President Reagan in 1987. The Administration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable on this Protocol, to which
165 States are a party. An extensive interagency review concluded that United States
military practice is already consistent with the Protocol's provisions. Joining the treaty
would not only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the international comm uni ty in developing the lawof armed conflict, but would also allow us to reaffirm our
commitment to humane treatment in, and compliance with legal standards for, the
conduct of anned conflict.
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which sets forth fundamental guarantees for persons in the hands of opposing forces in an international armed conflict, is similarly important to the international legal framework. Although the Administration continues
to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I, Article 75 is a provision of the
treaty that is consistent with our current policies and practice and is one that the
United States has historically supported.
Our adherence to these principles is also an important safeguard against the mistreatment of captured U.S. military personnel. The U.S. Government will therefore choose
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out of a sense oflega! obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed confl ict, and expects all other
nations to adhere to these principles as well. 55
The comments of the Reagan adm inistration and m ore recently of the Obama
administration would seem to belie the dismissive remarks of George Aldrich regarding the value of Additional Protocol II , reported earlier in this essay.Sti In sharp
contrast to the Aldrich position, both the Reagan and Obama administrations state
forcefully that ratification of Additional Protocol II would greatly expand on and
strengthen the humanitarian provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. President Reagan pointed o ut that Additional Protocol II " makes clear
that any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international
armed conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a crime against humanity, and is
therefore also punishable as m urder. "57
In another part of his message President Reagan foreshadows the approach
more specifically adopted by the Obama ad ministration with respect to Additional
Protocol 1. While emphatically rejecting ratification of Additional Pro tocol I, he
stated at the same time a desire to
devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of
real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed conflicts. We are therefore in the processof consulting with our allies to deveJop appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that govern our
military operations, and as customary international law. I will advise the Senate of the
results of this initiative as soon as it is possible to do SO. 58
It appears that President Reagan never advised the Senate of the results of his

administration's initiative. For its part, the Obama administration appears to have
acted without consulting allies-altho ugh this is not clear-in deciding to treat
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I as binding on the United States and choosing to
" treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains
in an international armed conflict," and expecting "all o ther nations to adhere to
these principles as well."59 If this policy is implem ented by the Obam a ad ministration, this would greatly strengthen the argument that Article 75 is part of customary international law.
As to whether the Senate will finally give its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol II , it is hard to be optimistic, because the Senate has so
many o ther issues before it that are likely to receive higher priority. But it appears
the Reagan and Obam a administrations have set forth a convincing case for the
Senate's giving its advice and consent to ratification.
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U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol II and application of its substantive
provisions to any armed conflict covered by Common Article 3 would also make
law in non-international armed conflict much less of a will-o'-the-wisp. This
would be an important step because, as Eyal Benvenisti has noted in a recent provocative essay,60 there is currently an emerging struggle between "states engaged
in transnational armed conflict [read non-international asymmetric warfare] and
third parties---courts, international institutions, NGOs, and civil society-in developing and enforcing the laW. "61
Ill. Who Shall Detennine the Lnw in Non-International Armed Conflicts?
As noted earlier in this essay, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia has concluded in its decisions that "customary rules have developed to
govern internal strife. "62 For his part, Benvenisti states emphatically that the applicability of international criminal law
to internal armed conflicts must be attributed to the jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunal ofthe former Yugoslavia ("ICIY"), which has in only a few years of
adjudicating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the law on internal
armed conflicts. By fo rmally asserting the law['Js customary status, the ICrY overcame
years of governmental resistance to regulating methods for fighting insurgents. 63

Benvenisti believes that the increased involvement of various third-party actors,
including domestic courts, foreign governments and courts, international organizations and international tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global
civil society, in indirect monitoring, lawmaking and enforcement functions constitutes a major challenge to States. As Benvenisti suggests:
[Tlhe intensified involvement of third parties creates a new confl ict between the conventional armies that fight insurgents o r terrorists and seek more discretion and fewer
constraints and the third parties who insist on maintaining and even increasing constraints in warfare. We might call it a conflict between the "IHL camp," that emphasizes
the hwnanitarian aim of the jlls in bello, which they refer to as International Humanitarian Law, and the "LOAC camp," that wishes to point out that the Law of Armed
Conflict is primarily designed to regulate the relations between fighting armies and
therefore must take military concerns seriously into account. The LOAC camp insists
that this "lawfare" is not only hypocri tical but also perilous: that the IHL camp is being
manipulated by the terrorists, who endanger the population on whose behalf they ostensibly fight by their abuse of civilian immunities. In a sense, and certainly unwillingly, the
IHL camp becomes a strategic ally of the terrorists because the terrorists benefit indirectly from whatever constraints the IHL camp would impose.64
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It is worthwhile quoting Benvenisti's swnmary of the argwnents of the thirdparty actors at some length, because they couldn't be more in sharp contrast to the
arguments advanced by governments, and their supporters, engaged in the asymmetric warfare characteristic of non-international armed conflict:
In general, third party actors. and certainly third party norm entrepreneurs, suggest
that the legal restraints on transnational conflict must treat the stronger party as responsible for positively protecting the population in the theater of operation from
harm because the stronger party often exclusively, has effective----even if only virtual--control over the population. In fact, with recourse to new types of weaponry and reconnaissance tools, with 24/7 presence of unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAV") over foreign territory, contemporary armies often have the capacity to control some of the
activities of the population on the ground effectively as an occupying power. Such control can perhaps be regarded as virtual occupatio n. As the law stands, during conventional international armed conflict, obligations to occupied populations are mo re
demanding than those toward fo reign civilians in the combat zone.
This last point requires explanation: in symmetric warfare, the attacker's power does
not amount to an ability to fully control the lives of the enemy's population. The defending government is still in control and in fact forcefully resists the attacker's effort to
gain exclusivity. Lacking such exclusive control, there is no basis to impose an obligation on the attacking army to Imsure enemy civilians' lives (protecting them, fo r example, from internal ethnic conflicts). Their army, which is still in control, has the duty to
ensure thei r rights. Instead, before and duri ng the attack, the attacking army owes a
duty to respect enemy civilians' lives, consisting of the duty to avoid unnecessary harm.
In contrast. the same army will assume the duty to e7lSure the rights of enemy civilians
when they become subject to its effective control as prisoners of war or "protected persons" in occupied territories. An obligation to ensure the civilians' rights is fundamentally different from an obligation to respect them, applicable to parties to symmetric
conflicts. The ve rtical power relatio ns that exist in transnational asymmetric conflicts,
particularly against non-state actors, seem to call for recognizing positive duties towards those civilians, like in an occupation. Such a duty will reflect the nature and
scope of the power that the "attacking" army (during an on-going, indefinite "attack")
has over the attacked population.
The obligation to protect in transna tional asymmetric armed conflict. if recognized,
would be quite demanding. It would call fo r three specific obligations. First, it would
require the consideration of alternatives to military action and the determination of
whether the decision to use fo rce against legitimate military targets rather than exploring non-forcible, or less-forcible alternatives. was justified under the circumstances. In
fact it would imply injectingjus ad bellum considerations, or hu man rights law, into
jus ill bello analysis. Secondly, if there were no available alternatives, a second requirement would demand that the army invest significant resources to minimize harm to
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civilians. Finally, the anny would be required to conduct a transparent and accountable investigation after the use of force.
A case in point concerns the dispute about targeted killing. This policy treats individuals as military targets per se, given the paucityofconventional non-human military targets of an irregular fighting force. The LOAC camp argues that annies that target
individual combatants regard them as legitimate targets in war, as there is no distinction between human and non-human military targets. But the alternative view issensitive to the fact that the laws regarded the killing of combatants as a legitimate mealls to
achieve military goals, rather than a goal in and of itself. AI; the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration envisioned, warwas not about killing combatants; wars were understood to be
fought to achieve non-human military goals and fighting was to be conducted against
an abstract, collective enemy. Therefore, itwas possible to stipulate that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weakell the
military forces of the enemy; That [sic[ for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the
greatest possible number of men.»Although war always involved the killing of combatants, killing the adversary was never the goal. Applying this logic to the effort to preempt individuals from engaging in an attack would require a consideration of whether
it is possible to di5'lble rather than kill them. This explains why the IHL camp insists on
pausing to consider alternatives to targeted killing; something that is viewed by the
LOAC camp as injecting irrelevant requirements of human rights law into jus ill bellD
analysis.
The tension between governments engaged in transnational warfare and third parties
can therefore not be starker: whereas governments seek to deny or dilute the applicability of conventional warfare obligations to transnational asymmetric conflicts, third
parties insist on their applicability and lean toward imposing even more stringent
constraints, which governments regard as impermissibly endangering their troops
and irresponsibly immunizing non-state fighters. Only time can tell if and how this
tension can be resolved. 6S
In the rest of his article Benvenisti argues that the growing involvement of third
parties in the monitoring and assessment of military decisions "raises a third challenge to the legal regulation of warfare: how to regulate the exercise of discretion by
the military commander."66 He suggests that in conventional, symmetric war fare
the parties to the conflict are presumed to promote their self-interests and not the
interests of the other government involved in the conflict. But with the pressure
from third parties to positively protect enemy civilians it has arguably become necessary for governments involved in n on-international armed conflicts to consider
interests other than their own. He notes that the greatly increased aCCeSS to information about such conflicts afforded by technical advances in technology and improved intelligence allows third parties to assess the exercise of discretion by the
military commander. He adds,
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If we accept that attacking armies in transnational asymmetric conflicts have a "duty
to ensure" the lives of civilians in the area they attack then perhaps they are expected to
treat all civilians with similar respect (obviously, such blindness would relate only to
the hwnan rights of the relevant civilians and not to the national interests of the foreign
state). It can be expe<:ted, however, that the WAC camp will resist such a conclusion,
stating that there is no moral or legal basis for the obligation to consider other-regarding
considerations in the absence of reciprocity and mutuality of obligations, when there is
no assurance that others are equally committed to act selflessly.61
In the conclusion to his article, Benvenisti states that
[il it is beyond the scope of this essay to assess if and how such a cleavage between two
visions of the law can be bridged and how the law would look in the future. Much
depends on the continued ability of courts, both domestic and international, to assert
positions independent of governments and the continued commitment of global civil
society to constrain conventional armies.... Even the domestic courts of those governments that engage in such conflicts resist the demand to yield authority to the executive. If these attitudes persist, it can be expected that the recourse to third parties as
partners in the regulation of transnational armed conflicts will expand. 68
By way of initial comment on some of the points made by Benvenisti, it shouJd
be noted that, although the domestic courts of some governments that engage in
non-international asymm etric armed conflict have asserted positions independent
of their governments on the reguJation of such conflicts,69 other domestic courts,
including those of the United States, have been quite deferential to the executive
branch's decisions with respect to the conduct of hostilities in such conflicts.7° A
good recent example of such deference by U.s. courts is the December 7, 2010 decision of the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a suit brought to
enjoin the targeted killing of U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi, who was operating out
of Yemen.ll The court ruled that the plaintiff (Al-AuJaqi's father) did not have
standing to bring the suit and that the political question doctrine barred the court
from considering the merits of the plaintiffs suit.
In describing the argwnents of third-party actors, Benvenisti states that "the legal
restraints on transnational conflict must treat the stronger party as responsible fo r
positively protecting the population in the theater of operation from harm because
the stronger party often exclusively, has effective--even if only virtual--<ontrol
over the population."72 In many cases involving asymmetric non-international
armed conflicts, however, the stronger party has no such control over the population. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces embed themselves among the general population. Moreover, in Afghanistan, it is important to
note, the sovereign power is not the U.S. government or coalition forces, but the
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Afghan government of President Karzai. Increasingly, the Karzai government has
demanded that there be no civilian casualties from drone or airplane attacks, thus
denying the coalition forces an important military advantage.
Moreover, to impose an obligation on U.S. and coalition forces, as demanded by
some third parties, to ensure that there are no civilian casualties in asymmetric
non -international armed conflicts would be a dramatic change in the law of armed
conflict and would ensure the failure of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan
and in other theaters where the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are operating. The reality is
that so-called "collateral damage" to civilians is unavoidable in ar med conflict, and
especially in the asymmetric non-international armed conflict characteristic of today's wars. The current test under the law of armed conflict is whether the collateral damage is expected to be "excessive" in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. 73
In a recent essay, Samuel Estreicher has helpfully emphasized that "[dlangers to
civilians during armed conflict are a joint product of both attackers and defenders,
and minimization of such harm- presumably the overriding mission of IHLrequires establishing the right incentives for bolll attackers and defenders."74
£Streicher also quotes the observat ion ofW. Hays Parks in his "classic" article, «Air
War and the Law of War," that
Protocol I constitutes an improvement in the law of war in recognizing that an attacker
should, in most cases, give consideration to minimization of collateral civilian casualties. The issue is the degree to which an attacker should assume this responsibility. If the
new rules of Protocol I are to have any credibility, the predominant responsibilitymust
remain with the defender, who has control over the civilian population.7s

£Streicher elaborates on Parks's point by noting that
[ilt is clear that attackers cannot, because of defender violations, claim excuse for their
non-compliance with, say, their duty to "do everything feas ible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians no r civilian objects" under AP I, Article
57(2)(a)(i). But the feasibility inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(i), or the proportionality
inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(iii), necessarily requi res that account be taken of
whether defenders have disguised military operations as civilian operations or have
deliberately embedded their military assets in close proximity to civilian areas, all in
violation of defender obligations under IHL.'6

In a subsequent, follow-up essay,77 Estreicher focuses on the "so-called principle of ' proportionality.'" He explains that he uses
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the qualifying adjective "so-called" because "proportionality" in this context is a misnomer. The actual obligation, as set forth in Articles 51(S)(b) and 57(2)(b) of AP I,
speaks in terms of prohibiting (and deferring) attacks expected to cause incidental
civilian losses "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated." . .. [TJhe "excessive loss" formulation is not only truer to the
text of AP I but provides a sounder, more principled basis for judging violations than
the more elastic, manipulable "proportionality" formulation. 78
The "excessive loss" formulation is afortiori a more principled basis for judging
violations than the requirement reportedly proposed by some third parties that
parties to asymmetric warfare "positively protect" enemy civilians. 79 To hold a military commander to such a standard would be grossly dysfunctional, as well as
grossly unfair if violations of this standard would subject the military commander
to possible criminal or civil penalties. Hence, it is certain that despite pressure that
may be brought to bear by third parties to asymmetric armed conflicts, this standard will be rejected by the governments of States that are engaged in such conflicts, including most particularly that of the United States.
IV. Conclusion
The title of this essay states there is a search for law in non-international armed
conflicts. Perhaps, however, a more precise way to describe the current situation is as
a struggle for law in non-international armed conflicts. As noted by Eyal Benvenisti,
this is a struggle between States that are actively involved in non-international
armed conflict and a wide array of third-party actors, such as domestic courts,
foreign governments and courts, international organizations and international tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global civil society. Some of these
third-party actors are promoting an agenda that, if adopted as law, could severely
restrict the military capacity of the armed forces of States to deal effectively with
Al-Qaeda and other non-State actors employing various strategies to negate the
military superiority of the States they are fighting against.
At least to some extent, these third-party actors have been able to be influential
because of the inability of States to reform and develop the law applicable to noninternational armed conflicts through the conclusion of global treaties that would
update the law in such a way as to resolve the tension between humanitarian considerations and the need for military efficiency. The recent efforts of the Obama administration to carry forward the position of the Reagan administration to have the
United States finally ratify Additional ProtocollI, while issuing a declaration that it
will not apply the high threshold requirements of the Protocol and will urge other
States parties to follow suit, may be a first step toward overcoming the barriers
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to expanding and improving the law of Don-international armed conflkt. Should
the United States take th is step, and other States follow suit, at a minim um it
should allow like- mined States to cooperate to improve the efficiency of efforts
to deal with the challenge they face in conducting asymmetrk warfare, and
could perhaps lead to State practice that evolves eventually into norms of customary international law applicable to non-international armed conflict. Failure
of States like the United States and its allies to win this struggle for law in non international armed conflicts with these third-party actors would have extremely
negative effects on their national security.
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